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Dr. Fred Kronen was a volunteer physician in Sandinista, Nicaragua, during the Start reading In Search of Peace, An American Doctor in Sandinista Nica on.
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These activities were generated to enable the democratic leaders and organizations to deal with the FSLN leadership from a position of strength. The United States hoped that the democratic Nicaraguans would focus paramilitary operations against the Cuban presence in Nicaragua along with other socialist groups and use them as a rallying point for the dissident elements of the Sandinista military establishment.

To increase the odds of success the United States worked with selected Latin American and European governments, organizations, and individuals to build international support for the objectives of the Nicaraguan democratic groups. Free Nicaraguan groups were encouraged to negotiate with the Nicaraguan government to reach an accord. Relations from foreign governments were encouraged to lend aid in efforts to eliminate the influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union over Nicaraguan government policies and restore freedom and democracy to Nicaragua.

Is Nicaragua Headed Back to Its Violent Past? Q&A with Felix Maradiaga | IPI Global Observatory

A intelligence report shows that the US Intelligence Community was monitoring shipments of Soviet-manufactured arms to Nicaragua. Specifically, Nicaragua had received four Soviet amphibious ferries at the El Rama port facilities via Algeria. According to the military intelligence , other military equipment had been removed in Algeria, such as multiple rocket launchers and 12 cargo trucks.

Whether this equipment was shipped elsewhere or would continue to Nicaragua later is unspecified, but as of the day of the report, none of these items had been seen in that Latin American nation. Furthermore, a US Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum for March estimated that there were, "some , Cubans currently in Nicaragua, of which 1,, are military and security personnel. This is what left them with the estimation that there were some 1,, Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua.

A confidential State Department cable dated October 20, detailed counterrevolutionary activity in Nicaragua.

Blood on the streets in Ortega’s corrupt Nicaragua

It stated that "Sandinista leaders continuously highlight the danger presented by the counterrevolution and link the Contras to alleged U. They have displayed captured weapons, ammunition, explosives, and communications gear to the press as evidence of U.

Casey authorization to "Support and conduct Nicaragua the government. President Reagan allowed the CIA to carry out covert plans to help the Contras overthrow the Sandinista government while putting laws into effect that criminalized the future actions of the Central Intelligence Agency. In , the CIA replaced the document with an upgraded one, in which "authorizes the provision of material support and guidance to Nicaraguan resistance groups; its goal is to induce the Sandinista government in Nicaragua to enter into meaningful negotiations with its neighboring nations.

This document also entails political action that was meant to take place: that being that the US "provide financial and material support The first, the Freedom Fighter's Manual, was airdropped to rebels over known Contra camps. This page manual was illustrated with captions to educate the mostly illiterate Contras on how to cause civil disruptions for the Sandinista government.

The manual started with simple instructions and ideas such as calling in sick to work to decrease production, which would hinder the economy. Soon, the instructions became more destructive, explaining how to perforate fuel tanks with ice picks and how to create Molotov cocktails and burn the fuel supplies. The second manual, "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare", was much more controversial in that it directly instigated the use of assassination or "neutralization" of Sandinista officials as a guerrilla warfare tactic as "selective use of violence for propagandistic effects" despite Reagan signing legislation that banned the intelligence community from using tactics that would directly or indirectly lead to assassinations.

The Nicaraguan Contras were then taught to invoke riots and shootings which would lead to the death of selected members of the cause, with the aim of martyrdom to gain support for the Contra cause.


When asked to answer for the manual in the second of two debates for the presidential election, President Reagan first stated, "We have a gentleman down in Nicaragua who is on contract to the CIA, advising — supposedly on military tactics — the Contras. And he drew up this manual. There's not someone there directing all of this activity. There are, as you know, CIA men stationed in other countries in the world and, certainly, in Central America. And so it was a man down there in that area that this was delivered to, and he recognized that what was in that manual was in direct contravention of my own Executive Order, [19] in December of , that we would have nothing to do with regard to political assassinations.

According to declassified CIA documents, covert activities in Nicaragua were a combination of political action, paramilitary action, propaganda, and civic action. Reagan's posture towards the Sandinista government was highly controversial both then and now. His Administration circumvented the Boland Amendment, although it is not clear what he knew and ordered, and what was done in his name by White House staff and the then- Director of Central Intelligence , William Casey.

The NSC staff's efforts to assist the contras in the wake of Congress's withdrawal of funding took many forms. Initially, it meant extending its earlier initiative to increase third-country contributions to the contras.

Nicaragua mothers mourn on eve of Sandinista revolution's anniversary - BBC News

Shultz warned that any approach to a third country could be viewed as an "impeachable offense," and convinced the group that it needed a legal opinion from Attorney General William French Smith. McFarlane agreed and told the group not to approach any foreign country until the opinion was delivered. McFarlane said nothing about what he already had obtained from the Saudis.

Questions arose as to the suitability of specific actions taken by the National Security Council staff and how the decision to transfer arms to Iran had been made. Congress was never informed. A variety of intermediaries, both private and governmental, some with motives open to question, had central roles.

The N. The President appeared to be unaware of the crucial elements of the operation. The controversy threatened a crisis of confidence in the manner in which national security decisions are made and the role played by the N. As a supplement to the normal N. These are contained in a classified document, NSDD, establishing the process for deciding, implementing, monitoring, and reviewing covert activities.

After the Boland Amendment was enacted, it became illegal under U. Oliver North and others continued an illegal operation to fund the Contras, leading to the Iran-Contra scandal. Such operations were justified under the pretense that the Boland Amendment did not specify what constituted an 'agency involved in intelligence gathering' beyond that of the CIA or DOD.

According to a memo by the Deputy Director of Intelligence , Nicaragua became a growing military force in the region. This was determined to be a growth too big for the apparent needs of the Nicaraguans. This led the government to suspect such growth. The concerns of Nicaragua growing as a communist hub in line with Cuba was growing stronger.

The Deputy Director compared it to the struggle that metastasized in Vietnam. In , U. Three CIA officials told journalists that they considered these reports "reliable.

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Hugo Spadafora , who had fought with the Contra army, outlined charges of cocaine trafficking to a prominent Panamanian official and was later found murdered. The charges linked the Contra trafficking to Sebastian Gonzalez Mendiola, who was charged with cocaine trafficking on November 26, , in Costa Rica. Bueso was a key figure in the CIA dealing with the Contras and "efforts [were] made The committee connected the crack-cocaine epidemic to the Contra-connected corporations and found that the drugs were distributed on the streets in Los Angeles.

CIA participation, albeit indirect, was a result of a partnership with well-known drug trafficker Alan Hyde. Hyde had been known by the criminal syndicate world to be a large distributor and trafficker of cocaine. From , the CIA cooperated with Hyde and used his vast network of covert shipping lanes in the Caribbean to supply arms to the Contras. The CIA operated during the crucial moments of proxy-war against the Sandinista government.

Petersburg air smuggling ring, the CIA authorized the use of more storage facilities owned by Hyde. However, the arms were being sold to Iran in exchange for hostages which Reagan soon revealed.

The arms sold included guns, cannons, ammunition, and tanks. The weapons were used against other American troops and resulted in hundreds of deaths of United States members of the armed forces.

CIA activities in Nicaragua

The American citizens felt betrayed by their leaders and soon uncovered numerous more scandals that the public was unaware of. The economic benefits of drug sales was a fact concealed by the malicious intention to focus on the sale of guns for money when all of the profits were truly found in the drug markets. McFarlane , Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, titled Supplemental Assistance to Nicaragua Program on 27 March , Casey writes, "In view of the possible difficulties in obtaining supplemental appropriations to carry out the Nicaraguan covert action project through the remainder of this year, I am in full agreement that you should explore funding alternatives with the Israelis and perhaps others.

I believe your thought of putting one of your staff in touch with the appropriate Israeli official should be promptly pursued. Shackley listened with interest as Ghorbanifar discussed ways to free the American hostages. Perhaps it could be a secret ransom, a straight cash deal. Or perhaps it could be profitable.

enter The United States could ship missiles to Iran, using a trading firm The sale of weapons would create goodwill in Tehran, millions for the private traders involved, and a large cash ransom to free Bill Buckley and his fellow American hostages. Shackley reported the conversation to the ubiquitous Vernon Walters, who passed it on the counter-terrorism czar Robert Oakley. In , William Casey made the decision to go ahead with the sale of American weapons to Iran, and use the money to fund the contras, all outside the government's knowledge.

President Reagan had been receiving pleas from the families of the hostages asking for something to be done. Reagan was deeply impacted by this and would turn to Bill Casey for solutions.

Nicaraguan Revolution: The Sandinistas, The Contras, & The CIA

Bob Gates said, in regards to Reagan's expectations of the CIA to end the crisis, "He put more and more pressure on Casey to find them. Reagan's brand of pressure was hard to resist. No loud words or harsh indictments—none of the style of Johnson or Nixon. Implicit was the accusation: What the hell kind of intelligence agency are you running if you can't find and rescue these Americans? The mining was carried out by CIA operatives on speedboats, operating from larger 'mother ships.

The mines were acoustic mines designed to frighten merchant sailors, rather than to harm them. The mines had the effect of disrupting Nicaraguan shipping and economic activities by blowing up numerous Nicaraguan fishing boats as well as several foreign merchant ships including a Soviet freighter and a Dutch dredger. Several Democrats called for a special prosecutor to determine if Reagan had broken federal law in ordering the mining and The New York Times called it "illegal, deceptive, and dumb" and compared it to German U-boats attacking neutral merchant shipping in World War 1.

In , Nicaragua presented a case to the International Court of Justice against the United States of America for violation of international law. The court ruled in favor of Nicaragua, and the United States was supposed to pay reparations to Nicaragua for violating international law by training and funding the Contra rebellion movement and for the mining and destruction of several Nicaraguan harbors.

Many more examples of the White Propaganda operation were communicated to Buchanan, but many were not to keep a low profile and not draw attention to the stories. Owen states that the new Southern Front officials of the FDN units include "people who are questionable because of past indiscretions.